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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S'TATE OF UTAH

LESTER A. JONES, dba ENGINE
& AIR SERVICE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.0. C. ALLEN, dba 0. C. ALLEN
COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 8709

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT
STATEMENT
This is an action for damages for an alleged breach
of an implied warranty in connection with gear lubricants delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff in its
original containers. It was alleged by the plaintiff that
the lubricant was used in certain vehicles, belonging to
others which were in the plaintiff's shop for repair and
that the vehicles were damaged by reason thereof. There
was a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff. The parties will
be referred to as in the court below.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Lester A. Jones, is engaged in the
business of overhauling trucks, stationary engines and
air compressors. Prior to becoming self-employed, Mr.
Jones was Superintendent for the Interstate Motor Lines.
He had worked for them for a period of 17 years (R. 27),
and while there he was in charge of the maintenance of
motor trucks and equipment and used gear lubricant
every day during the period of his employment. He used
nothing but Kendall 200 oil in all of the equipment (R.
28). He has been self-employed since 1952 and continued
the use of Kendall 200 gear lubricant in his business
(R. 31).

The defendant, 0. C. Allen, is engaged in the wholesale oil business and has been for 40 years (R. 121). He
has been buying and distributing Kendall oil off and on
during that period (R. 122). During all times material
to this lawsuit the defendant has purchased Kendall oil
and lubricants from the Williams Oil Cmnp.any, a distributor for l{endall Oil Company. The product comes
directly from the Kendall factory to the \Villiams Oil
Company and is stored in its warehouse until ordered by
and delivered to the defendant. The defendant would
then store the lubricant in his warehouse until he re<'eived an order from one of his custmners. The containers were never opened by the defendant (R. 122).
In tlw Fall of 1955, l\Ir. Bate1nan, a cu.stomer of the
plaintiff, took to the plaintiff's shop five trucks for reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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pair (R. 32). Only two of the five trucks are alleged to
have been damaged (R. 53-54) although the same lubricant was used in all (R. 53). The two trucks s.aid to have
been damaged we~re designated as Eaton 28M (R. 34,37).
On the 6th day of November, 1955, the plaintiff ordered
from the defendant by trade name 100 pounds of Kendall
SAE 90-140 gear lubricant (Exhibit 9). The gear lubricant w.as delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff in a
100 pound red can marked Kendall SAE 140 gear lubricant (R. 34, Exhibit 5). For the purposes of this lawsuit
Kendall SAE 140 gear lubricant and Kendall 200 lubricant are the same (R. 162). The container described the
lubricant as ordered. When the container was received
by the plaintiff it was sealed (R. 75). Approximately
50 pounds of gear lubricant delivered on the 6th day of
November, 1955, were used in the Eaton rear end assembly of the first truck alleged to have been damaged (R.
35).
When the oil from the first barrel was put in the
E.aton assembly the plaintiff noticed that it was thinner
oil than he had been getting (R. 78-79). The balance of
the gear lubricant from the first barrel was used in the
single drive International which sustained no damage
(R. 53-54). The next vehicle to be repaired by the plaintiff was the other unit allegedly dam.aged, which unit
also cont,ained an Eaton rear end assembly (R. 34, 37).
At the time this unit was repaired plaintiff was out of
gear lubricant (R. 38). The plaintiff called the defendant
.and told him he needed another barrel of Kendall oil to
get the truck out and the defendant delivered the same
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on the 14th day of December, 1955 (Ex. 10), a duplica~
tion of the first order (Ex. 9). The lubricant was delivered in a 100 pound container marked Kendall gear
lubricant (R. 39, Ex. 5) sealed in the same manner as the
first b.arrel and in the same condition as received from
the Kendall factory (R. 122).
.- ....

The plaintiff in ordering the lubricant described the
type he wanted by ordering Kendall 200 gear lube. He
did not make known to the defendant how he intended to
use the gear lubricant or what equipment he intended to
use it in and the defendant made no representations in
conneetion therewith (R. 38-39).
As quickly as the ge.ar lubricant was delivered and
opened the plaintiff noticed it was thin like the first
barrel. Disregarding this fact, however, the plaintiff
used approximately fifty pounds of the gear lubricant in
the second truek containing an Eaton assembly (R. 40).
During the month of January, 1956, ~Ir. Long, who
was employed by ~Ir. Bateman, the owner of the trucks
being repaired, took the R 190, the first truck .alleged
to have been da1naged, back to the plaintiff's shop. ~Ir.
Long ·and the plaintiff drove the truck, the s.ame vibrating
considerably. The plaintiff told ~Ir. Long not to pay
too n1uch attention to it (R. -Hi--±7). ~Ir. Long took the
truck out of the shop, hauled one 1nore load and then
returned the truck to the plaintiff. The plaintiff examined the trnek and found that the pinion shaft had
h('('ll eut elcar to a knife's edge and that the pinion in
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the running gear w.as cut off almost to the same point.
The rear end of the truck was removed, washed and inspected (R. 48). The R 191, the second allegedly damaged
truck, was returned to the plaintiff's shop by Mr. Bateman and the identical damage was discovered. The plaintiff does not know if .any lubricants were added to the
rear ends of the R 190 or R 191 from the time they left
his shop until they were returned by l\Ir. Long (R. 80).
l\1r. Baternan testified that the trucks were checked continually while in operation and if they were found to be
in need of transrnission oil the same was added (R. 94).
Even though the plaintiff used the same gear lubricant
in the other three pieces of equipment belonging to Mr.
B.ateman he could not find anything wrong with them,
however, he put in new lubricant and the same are still
operating as far as he knows ( R. 53-54).
Sometirne after the trucks were returned to the plaintiff's shop the plaintiff notified the defendant that there
was something wrong with the oil. In response to the
plaintiff's telephone call, the defendant went to the
plaintiff's shop. They inspected the parts of the truck
in question and the defendant took a sample of the oil
from a pan in Mr. Jones' garage lying next to one of
the trucks. The defendant does not know from which
truck the oil was taken or how long it had remained in
the pan. He sent the sample of the oil to the Kendall
Oil Company (R. 134-135).
A letter was later received from the Kendall Oil
Company which in substance and effect stated that the
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sample submitted to it was not representative of the Kendall 200 gear lubricant (Ex. 11). The admitting of the
exhibit into evidence was objected to by the defendant
and will be referred to in greater detail in the argument.
The plaintiff put some of the oil remaining in the
barrel in a pint fruit jar and sent it to the University of
Utah for a test (R. 52). The oil was given to a Mr. George
Petty, who at that time was working as a student instructor in the Chemistry Department of the University of
Utah. i\Ir. Petty did not run any chemical test on the oil
to determine its contents. The only thing done by him
was to take the oil, heat it and measure it for viscosity
(R. 18). Mr. Petty did not know whether he was testing
motor oil or lubricant, however, he admits that there
is a distinction and that the test would be different for
motor oil and for gear lubricants (R. 19).
Both the oil companies and the manufacturers of the
various trucks and equipment n1ake recommendations as
to the type of oil or gear lubricant to be used in certain
pieces of equipment. The Eaton ~Ianufacturing Company, which company manufactures the tanden1 drive
axle found in the R 190 and the R 191, require a hypoid
E.P. lubricant in order to haYe trouble free operation
(Ex. 7), a gear lubricant different from Kendall 200
as ordered by plaintiff (Ex. 11).
Even though the plaintiff was fmniliar with the
Eaton reemmnendations and knew that a hypoid lubrieant w.as reeonunended on tlw theory that it helps the oil
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to stick to the gears (R. 70), he disregarded recommendations and used one type of oil in all equipment repaired
(R. 66-67). The plaintiff did this partly from experience
and partly for his own convenience in servicing the
trucks in his shop ( R. 68).
The plaintiff readily admits that after the incident
in question he followed the recommendations of the manufacturers and u.sed the recommended type of lubricant
for the type of rear end in question and had no further
problems (R. 84).
The defendant's position, by his pleading and requested instructions, was to the effect that the lubricant
ordered by plaintiff was ordered by the trade name and
number; that plaintiff did not advise the defendant for
what type of trucks the lubricant was to be used or to
what use the lubricant was to be put; that defendant, at
the special instance and request of plaintiff, delivered
in sealed drums or b.arrels the type of lubricant ordered
by plaintiff (R. 5).
The jury rendered a verdict of $1168.86 .against the
defendant (R. 179). Subsequently the court overruled
and denied defendant's motion for judgment in accordance with motion for directed verdict and in the alternative the defendant's motion for a new trial (R. 183-184).
STATEMENT OF POINTS

1. The court erred in its instructions to the jury.
Under this point attention will be called to Instruction
No.2 and Special Verdict Group 4 (R. 157,177, Exception
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139), and In.struction No. 10 (R. 164, Exception 139).
Under the Special Verdict Group 4 and the corresponding
Instruction No. 2 the court improperly instructed the
jury a;s to the burden of proof. Under Instruction No.
10 the court held the defendant to the consequences of a
warranty and confused the situation with a guaranty by
the defendant to the plaintiff.
2. The refusal of the court to give Defendant's
requested Instructions 2 (R. 170), 3, 4, 5 (R. 151), 6
(R. 152) and 7 (R. 153), for which exceptions were duly
taken (R. 140-141), is error under this point. The requests in the main placed the responsibility on the plaintiff, who got just what he ordered, and that the lubricant
was sold in the manufacturer's container by trade name.
Furthermore, that there was no implied warranty on the
part of the defendant and the evidence is insufficient to
show that he knew or had any reason to know of the alleged defect in quality of the lubricant so supplied.
3. The court erred in denying defendant's motion
for a directed verdict and in the alternative his motion
for ,a new trial; the former on the ground that the evidence was insufficient and both n1otions raising the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict in fayor of p~aintiff. The 1notion for a new trial
ra i ~P< l the question of the confusion in the instructions
and thP admi~~ihility of Exhibit 11.
The yerdict and the judg1nent entered thereon
an• eontrary to law and not supported by the evidence.
--1-.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•.,
......

•

9
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS ARE ERRONEOUS AND CONFUSING.

It becomes obvious on reading the Special Verdict
Group 4 .and corresponding Instruction No. 2
that the court improperly instructed the jury
as to the burden of proof. In Instruction No. 2 the court
placed upon the defendant the burden of proving that
an ordinarily prudent truck repairman would not have
relied on the said oil as being 200 Kendall SAE 140. In
the same instruction the court does not require the
plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that .an ordinarily prudent truck repairman would have
relied on the said oil as being 200 Kendall SAE 140. The
plaintiff in his complaint alleges reliance, which is one
of the essential elements to be proved by a person alleging a breach of warranty. In the case of Topeka Mill &
Elevator Co. v. Triplett (Kan.), 213 P.2d 964, the plaintiff commenced an action to recover the balance due on
an account for chicken feed. The defendants filed a cross
petition for damages from the plaintiff by reason of the
alleged false and fraudulent representation concerning
the feed. The court held that the evidence failed to establish an express warranty on the part of the plaintiff as to
the quality of the feed sold or what it would accomplish
or that there was any reliance on an alleged warranty by
the defendants. In this c.ase the Court st ated:
1
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"Absent the establishment of her reliance upon the alleged warranty no actionable warranty
existed.
·

* * *
\V e think appellants' evidence failed to establish an express warranty and that such a warranty, if made, was relied upon by Mrs. Triplett."
It is also a fundamental rule of law that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence e.ach and every material allegation contained in
his complaint. The court in its Special Yerdict Group 4
and the corresponding Instruction No. 2 ·wrongfully
placed this burden upon the defendant.
Instruction No. 10 is contrary to the evidence, does
not properly state the law, is ambiguous, confusing and
inconsistent with other instructions given by the trial
court. In the first part of the instruction the Court instructs the jury that it was immaterial that the oil was
delivered in a sealed container and in the same condition
as received from the Kendall factory. In 77 C.J.S. Sales,
Section 325, page 1179 it is stated:

"*** "There a wholesaler sells goods to a
dealer for resale, there is no in1plied warranty of
fitne~~ for use, especially if the dealer sells the
merchandise in unbroken packages received by
him fr01n the wholesaler."
Un<1Pr the same sPetion the author cites the case of
1Jfaro11cy v. J!ontgomcry Tranl & Co., 34 S.E. 2d 302, 72
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Ga. App. 485, Bell v. Adler) 11 S.E. 2d 495, 63 Ga. App.
473, and states as follows:
"A dealer does not impliedly warrant that
an article in a perfect appearing original package manuf,actured by a reputable manufacturer,
which in practical use in retail trade could not be
examined for imperfections, is suitable for purposes intended, and the only warranty by dealer
in such circumstances is that article is manufactured by a reputable manufacturer."
In 77 C.J.S. Section 330, page 1191, it is stated:
"It has been held that there is no implied
warranty of quality or fitne.ss on the part of a
retailer who sells fertilizer in the original packages.''
To hold otherwise would place an unreasonable burden upon the defendant and would allow the plaintiff to
escape liability, even though he is negligent.
Instruction No. 10 also interprets a warranty as a
guarantee, while in fact, the two are clearly distinguishable. A guarantee places liability upon the defendant
regardless of whether or not he made repre.sent.ations in
connection with said oil and ignores the question of inspection by and negligence of the plaintiff. Not only is
the instruction ambiguous in the above particulars, but
the Court by using the following language:

"*** the theory of warranty which is a doctrine of the law requiring of sellers that they
guarantee to the purchasers that the product
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which they furnish is as ordered by the purchaser
and in accordance with the representation made
when the product purchased is delivered." (R.

164).
implied that certain representations were made by the
defendant to the plaintiff, while in fact, no representations were made whatsoever and the implication would
necessarily mislead and confuse the jury.
POINT II.
THE 'TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS.

The trial court erred in refusing Defendant's Requested Instructions No. 5 and 8 pertaining to sales under patent or trade name. The oil delivered by the defendant was ordered under a trade name and delivered
in a se.aled container. The plaintiff, in ordering the oil,
described to the defendant the type of oil he wanted, but
did not make known to the defendant how he intended to
use it and the defendant n1ade no representations in connection therewith. The plaintiff acted on his mn1 desires
and took his own chances as to the fitness of the article.
B. F. Sturtevant Co. v. LeJiars Gas Co. (1920), lSS Iowa
584, 176 N.W. 338.
If a thing is ordered for a special purpose and suppljt~d and sold for that purpose there 1nay be an ilnplied
warranty that it is fit for that purpose, but this rule is
lin1ited to cases where a thing is ordered for a special
purpose and n1ust not be applied in cases where a special,
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definite described thing is ordered, although it is intended for an undisclosed special purpose. In fact, where
there is a sale of a known, described, definite article
there is no warranty of fitness for ,a particular purpose.
In Section 60-1-15, Subsection (4), Utah Code Annotated
1953, it is provided:
"In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of
a specified article under its patent or other trade
name, there is no implied warranty a,s to its fitness for .any particular purpose."
The only warranty is that the goods are fit for the
purpose for which the article is ordinarily or generally
sold. The cases apparently hold that where the selection
of the article is actually made by the buyer, the foregoing
rule applies even though the seller knows that the buyer
is purchasing the article for some special use. 46 Am.
Jur., Sales, Section 351, pages 535-536; 90 A.L.R. 410;
Landes & Co. v. Fallows, 81 Utah 432, 19 P.2d 389. In
the case of Green Mountain Mushroom Co. v. Brown
(Va.), 95 A.2d 679, page 683, it is stated:
"The general rule is that if an article known
under a patent name or tr.ade-name is ordered and
furnished, there is no implied warranty for a particular purpose, since the buyer received what he
bargained for."
The above rule is controlling where goods are sold by
a trade name. In the instant case .a particular purpose
was not made known to the defendant, the article was
not supplied for any particular purpose and the plaintiff
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did not rely on the seller'~ skill and judgment, therefore,
it falls squarely within the rule set forth .above.
The refusal to give defendant's instructions as to
inspection and sealed containers was error. In the instant
case the oil was delivered from the Kendall Oil Company
factory to the William.s Oil Company and later delivered
to the defendant. The defendant then placed the oil
in his warehouse in the same container as received from
the Williams Oil Company where it remained until
ordered by and delivered to the plaintiff in the same
condition as received from the Kendall factory. The
container was not subject to inspection until opened by
the plaintiff and placed in a dispenser for the purpose
of being used in the equipment in his shop for repair.
The plaintiff, and not the defendant, had the first opportunity to inspect the oil and, in fact, did inspect the
same. Upon said inspection the plaintiff noted that the
oil w.as thin. The plaintiff made the same observation
in connection with both barrels of oil delivered by the
defendant. Where the buyer of goods has a better opportunity for inspection than the seller, and where such
an inspection ought to have revealed an existing defect
there can be no warranty of fitness. £\7 atio1wl Cotton Oil
Co. v. Young (1905), 74 Ark. 14-1,85 S.\Y. 92.
The plaintiff has been engaged in the business of
servicing trucks for .a period in excess of 33 years. He i~
thoroug-hly familiar with oils and has been advised by
various 1nanufacturers and distributors of oil and equipment as to the proper type of oil to be used in the equip-
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ment which he repairs. The plaintif~ claims that the
damage to the equipment involved in this lawsuit w.as
caused by an oil which was too thin and for that reason
failed to properly lubricate the gear mechanism. The
defect which the plaintiff himself discovered on inspecting the oil was the same defect which he claims defendant
should respond for in damages. The plaintiff by using
the gear lubricant after discovering the defect is estopped
from asserting a breach of warranty in light of Section
60-1-15, Subsection (3), Utah Code Annotated 1953,
which reads as follows:
"If the buyer has examined the goods, there
is no implied warranty as regards defects which
such examination ought to have revealed."
He is further precluded from recovering from the defendant under the doctrine of negligence. If the defendant were in any way negligent in supplying to the plaintiff oil of a defective quality, the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in using the same after discovering the
defect. In 46 Am. Jur., Sales, Section 807, page 931, it
is stated:
"Contributory N egligence.-In spite of his
negligence, a seller is, of course, not liable therefor to a buyer who, by his own negligent conduct,
has contributed to the injury. And while the use
of the purchased article in a particular manner
which would otherwise appear to be negligent
may be proper where the buyer relies, and has a
right to rely, upon the seller's assurance that it
is safe to use the article in such a manner, a buyer
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who uses the article after he discovers the danger
will be held to have as.sumed all the risk of damage to himself, notwithstanding the seller's assurance of safety. * * *"
This is true even though the seller may have given
some assurance to the buyer of the safety in using said
oil. Where it is clearly apparent from casual observation that the defendant delivered something different
than that ordered, and with full knowledge of that fact
he used the thing ordered to his detriment, the plaintiff
is negligent and cannot recover.
Even though the evidence in the instant case conclusively shows that the plaintiff ordered oil under a
specific trade name in a sealed container, and made an
inspection upon delivery, the court refused to grant the
Defendant's Requested Instructions :2, 3, -±, 5, 6, and 7.
By failing to give said instructions the trial court not
only disregarded the evidence in the case, but also the
law on sales.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A DIRE.CTED VERDICT AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE HIS MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

\Vhat ha~ prC'Yi<nl~ly been said under point :2 proper1)' supports tlw defendant's 1notion for a directed Yerdid or in t h<' alternat iYC' for a n<:"w trial. The only thing
left to lH' eov<>red under this point is the adn1issibility of
Exhihit 11 into Pvidence.
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Exhibit 11 is a letter from the Kendall Oil Company
to the defendant acknowledging the receipt of oil allegedly removed from one of the pieces of the equipment damaged. The letter was offered in evidence by the plaintiff
and objected to by the defendant as being incompetent.
The trial court admitted the exhibit over the defendant's
objection. The second paragraph of the letter reads as
follows:
"Our laboratory report, number 56156, found
the gear lube sample to be an SAE 90 EP Gear
Lubricant with a viscosity index of only 89.6. In
other words, the sample submitted to us was not
representative of Kendall #200 Gear Lube, which
had been reported as having been used in the
above mentioned rear .axle."
The defendant takes the position that Exhibit 11 is
hear.say and for that reason incompetent, and further
is prejudicial. There is nothing in the letter to indicate
how the examination of the oil was made. In the letter
certain material facts are missing, which facts cannot be
put before the court and jury as the writer is not in
court subject to cross examination. Had the plaintiff
called Mr. Hulme, the writer of the letter, as a witness,
then the defendant would have had an opportunity to
examine him in connection with the test made by his
company. The fact that the oil had been placed in the
truck and run for a certain period of time, and that there
was a possibility of certain impurities and solvents being
in the oil and how the test itself was run are material
elements in determining the accuracy of the statement
contained in paragraph 2 of the letter.
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The subject matter of this letter is addres.sed to the
most vital fact in controversy, namely: whether or not
the gear lubricant sold by the defendant, and used by the
plaintiff, was representative of Kendall 200 gear lubricant. The letter offered in evidence to prove the facts
asserted therein is an out of court statement, not subject
to cro.ss examination and not under oath, and is hearsay.
Baird v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 49 Utah 58, 162 P. 79;
Bucher v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States,
91 Utah 179, 63 P.2d 604.
I -...

A hearsay statement offered as proof of the matters
asserted therein cannot be accepted because it has not
been made at a time and place where it can be subjected
to certain essential tests or investigations calculated to
demonstrate its real value by exposing latent sources of
error. It is an untested assertion. The fundamental test
of evidence is the right of cross examination. The reason
for this is that many possible deficiencies, suppressions,
sources of error and untrustworthiness, which may lie
underneath the hare untested assertions of a "\\itness, may
be best brought to light and exposed by the test of cross
examination. See Wigmore on Eridence, Vol. 5, 3rd Ed.,
Sections 1361-1362. 'vllere it appears that the evidence
admitted is in fact incompetent and prejudicial its adnlission is grounds for reversal.
POINT IV.
THE VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
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From what has been previously stated the verdict
of the jury and the judgment entered thereon are contrary to the evidence and the law as it pertains to warranties.
CONCLUSION
The fact the gear lubricant was ordered by the
plaintiff under a trade name, was delivered in a sealed
container, was inspected by the plaintiff and appeared to
be thin, wa.s placed in equipment requiring a different
type lubricant and of which plaintiff was aware, .and
the fact that the plaintiff did not make known to the
defendant how he intended to use the lubricant, and
the defendant made no representations in connection
therewith, are all sufficient to support .a reversal.
The errors of the court in refusing Defendant's Requested Instructions, improperly instructing the jury as
to the burden of proof, the definition of a warranty
and the admission of Exhibit 11 into the evidence, added
fuel to the fire. In the interest of substantial justice
between the parties this judgment should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON,
and WILLIAMS. RICHARDS
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
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